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So for me, it's an axiom. Word of mouth is very powerful online, so that if you 
make a customer happy, they can tell 5,000 people. And if you make them 
unhappy, they'll certainly tell 5,000 people. So each customer can be his or her 
own ombudsman, and that's just bound to shift the balance of power toward the 
customer.        (Jeffery P. Bezos) 
More puzzling to me is why everyday people post reviews.  (Steven D. Levitt) 
1. Introduction 
It has become a widespread practice in e-commerce to ask for customer opinions (	

. Customers are asked to comment on product quality and experience or on business’ 
service satisfaction. The comments and ratings are published on internet sites, freely 
accessible to other consumers. Some internet companies, such as epinions.com, CNET, 
BizRate.com, and resellerratings.com, are specialized in collecting and distributing comments 
and ratings on thousands of items and on hundreds of other internet shops. With his “axiom” 
on the electronic word of mouth, Jeffery Bezos, the founder of amazon.com, suggests that the 
unrestricted online visibility gives customer ratings and recommendations a much greater 
impact than they ever had offline (Business Week Online 1999). In fact, empirical studies find 
positive correlations between consumer rating and sales (


 as well 
as between third party ratings of online buying experience and the shareholder value of the 
rated e-commerce firms, (Kotha, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2004). Hence, scoring high in 
the customer reviews is more than just prestige. It is in the firms’ financial interest.  
But, why do customers provide the information, even though doing so is costly and entails no 
obvious benefit for themselves? Why do they not free ride as economists, such as Steven 
Levitt (2005), generally expect them to, when confronted with a non-enforced public goods 
provision? Purely self-interested individuals would not engage in the voluntary provision of 
information public goods. In fact, providing information public goods is even less attractive 
than providing most other public goods. Providers of information public goods do not 
participate in the benefits, because they are already in possession of the information that they 
transmit to others.1 Hence, when sharing information is costly, providing information public 
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 Technically speaking, the marginal return to the provider is zero.  
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goods is not a Pareto efficient outcome, because the provider incurs a cost without gaining 
any benefit. Thus, if information public goods are provided voluntarily, there must be some 
form of other-regarding preference that motivates behavior.2  
We present an experiment that allows us to observe the provision of information public goods 
and to compare its prevalence in different settings. We vary the effects of the information 
disclosure on the recipients and the anonymity of the provider. The former variation consists 
of an opportunity and a hazard treatment, where information providers can either reveal an 
opportunity to the recipient or alert the recipient on a hazard. The latter variation consists of a 
fully anonymous and a voluntarily identification setting.     
All combinations of our variations are of empirical relevance. The opportunity treatment 
resembles typical online recommendations, in which consumers inform other consumers on 
especially advantageous goods or services. The hazard treatment resembles not only the case 
of online customer warnings, but also the case of individually provided warnings coming 
through other media, such as traffic information passed by telephone to radio stations.3 In 
both cases, the informing parties may remain anonymous or choose a nick name that is used 
to identify them as the source of the information.  
In the field, the motivations underlying this kind of information provision cannot always be 
neatly separated. Those providing information public goods may often be purely altruistic, 
trying to help others. But, sometimes other motives may also play a role. Some websites offer 
minuscule financial incentives for reviews and recommendations.4 Another motivation to 
provide reviews may be to gain fame and eventually start a career as a professional reviewer. 
Others may want to be top on the list of the “most useful reviews” that is provided by many 
websites. Some may try to make a product successful intending to increase the positive 
                                                          
2
 Avery, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (1999) introduce smart ways to solve the free-riding problem of information 
provision by introducing a market for evaluations, in which early consumers are paid for their reports by late 
consumers. Interestingly, such markets for evaluations are still rather rare, perhaps indicating that people are 
willing to provide the public good without pecuniary incentives.  
3
 The perhaps most frequently observed provision of hazard information goods are the traffic jam and radar trap 
warnings that are aired on radio. Much of the information for these airings originates from calls by car drivers, 
who have either been affected themselves or have noticed the congestion or the radar trap driving on a different 
lane. In either case, they pay for the telephone call, even though they have no obvious advantage from doing so.  
4
 For example, amazon.com experimented with giving writers of first review the chance to win a prize.  
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network effects.5 Of course, our list of potential motives for the provision of information 
public goods is not exhaustive. Next to other motives that we did not mention, any mixture of 
various motivations is also conceivable.6 
Our experimental setup enables us to avoid the difficulties separating mixed motives in the 
field. We deliberately exclude all other incentives and concentrate only on sharing 
information in a one-shot game, in which the provision of information public goods is purely 
altruistic.7 The experimental procedure allows us to use a 2x2 factorial design to examine how 
payoff and anonymity constellations affect information sharing.  
Our experimental data show high rates of information sharing with significant differences in 
the treatments. We find that extreme outcomes are reported significantly and substantially 
more often than moderate outcomes, no matter whether they are positive or negative. This 
seems in line with earlier findings on non-electronic word-of-mouth, which indicate that 
extreme satisfaction and dissatisfaction lead to higher levels of word-of-mouth activity than 
medium levels (Anderson 1998). Furthermore, we find that the possibility of identification, 
which is chosen by a little more than two-thirds of our subjects in each of the two payoff 
treatments, only enhances the frequency of reporting extreme opportunities (high positive 
outcomes), but not the frequency of reporting any other value. Comparing those who choose 
to be anonymous in the identification setting with those who take on a name, we observe a 
significantly higher percentage of extreme value reports in the hazard treatment, but not in the 
opportunities case. In other words, deliberately anonymous subjects only report extreme 
hazards, while subjects taking on an id also report moderate gains.  
Finally, we use a sample of review data on classical music CDs from amazon.de to check the 
conclusions of our experimental results in the field. In agreement with other studies (



 we find that most reviews are positive. Assuming that hardly anyone has 
an extremely negative (hazardous) experience when buying a classical music CD, this result 
can be interpreted as observing that consumers tend to report extremely positive experiences 
                                                          
5
 For example, having many people read the same book, increases chances of having an intellectual exchange on 
the book, or having many people buy the same electronic game, increases chances of updates and extensions.  
6
 In a survey study, Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, Walsh, and Gremler (2004) find “[…] that the concern for other 
customers, extraversion/positive self-enhancement, social benefits, economic incentives, and to a lesser extent, 
advice seeking, all serve to motivate […] the number of comments written on opinion platforms.” (pp. 48-49)  
7
 In this study we consider non-manipulated truthful information sharing only. 
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more frequently than mediocre experiences. Furthermore, we find that as in our experimental 
results on the opportunity treatment about two-thirds of the reviewers identify themselves and 
that deliberate identification is not correlated to ratings. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental model and briefly 
discusses its theoretical properties. In section 3 the experimental procedure is described. 
Section 4 reports the experimental results and in section 5 we conclude. Section 6 reports 
some “anecdotal evidence” from reviewing at amazon.de. 
2. The Game 
The structure of the game 
We consider a game with seven players that form a chain, i.e. they decide one after the other. 
There is a basket containing 60 items. 25 percent of the items have an extreme value and 75 
percent of the items have a moderate value. The extreme and the moderate value are chosen 
such that a random draw from the basket has an expected value of zero. At the beginning of 
the chain no item value is reported and thus no item value is known to the first player.  
The game commences with the first player in the chain randomly drawing 20 items from the 
basket. The player is informed that she is the first player in the chain and that no item values 
are reported yet. The player decides which of the drawn items to keep. Keeping items means 
realizing their values as payoffs. Since all item values are hidden for the first player, she 
decides in absolute ignorance of the item values. Risk-seeking players should take all items. 
Risk-neutral players can take any arbitrary number of items. Risk-averse players should not 
keep any item. Players with other-regarding preferences, however, may keep items, even if 
they are risk-averse, given that their utility from giving information to the successors is 
greater than their disutility from taking the risk of incurring a loss.  
After a player has decided how many (and which) of the items to keep, she may report the 
value of each of the yet unreported items that she has kept. Reporting the item value is costly, 
but makes it potentially visible for all successors in the chain.8 The remaining players 2 to 7 
are in an identical decision situation, except that the number of disclosed item values varies. 
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 A successor only sees the value if the item is one of those that she has randomly drawn. 
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Before making a decision they are informed about their position in the chain and the number 
of item values that are reported by the predecessors. Again each player randomly draws 20 
items from the basket. In case any items are drawn that have been reported by predecessors, 
the player is informed of these values. Otherwise, the items values are unknown to the player. 
The player decides which of the drawn items to keep. Again, the player may report the value 
of each yet unreported item that he has kept, so that the item value becomes potentially visible 
for all successors in the chain. Each player’s payoff is the sum of the values of kept items 
minus reporting cost of one point per reported item value.  
Linking the game to the field 
The basket of 60 items represents the complete set of goods under consideration, e.g. digital 
cameras. We assume that each customer is only able to examine a subset of the goods. Hence, 
in our experiment, we restrict the relevant set per subject to a random sample of 20 items. 
Some of these items have possibly been rated by previous customers, while others have 
totally unknown values. We assume that the evaluation reveals the true value of the item, 
which is identical for all customers. This is obviously a simplification, especially in the case 
of experience goods such as books or CDs. In the case of technical goods, the assumption is 
less restrictive, because quality criteria are more likely to be inter-subjectively verifiable.  
The items a player keeps are the items a customer chooses to consume.9 The value associated 
with an item is the net benefit of consuming the item. If the value is positive, the consumer’s 
benefit is increased, if it is negative, the consumer’s benefit decreases.  
Each consumer may report the value information to succeeding customers. This information 
provision is associated with a small cost, which models the cost of writing a report or calling 
the radio station from a mobile phone. As at any online rating site, there is no way of telling 
who used the information and no way of receiving a reward in the future. Basically, there is 
no traceable interaction between information providers and information recipients, except 
through the evaluation.  
                                                          
9
 Since we assume that the item payoffs are net of the item price, our subjects only need to decide to keep or not 
to keep. 
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The experimental parameters and treatments 
We consider four variations of the game that translate into the four treatments of the 
experiment. Two variations concern the payoff structure. In the opportunity setting, the 
extreme value is +12 and the moderate value is -4. In the hazard setting, the extreme value is 
-12 and the moderate value is +4. The opportunity setting is inspired by situations like 
amazon.com, where the sharing information helps to select rare excellent books and to avoid 
the more likely mediocre books. The hazard setting is inspired by the radio announcement of 
traffic jams and radar traps, where the provided information helps to avoid rare costly speed 
control. In addition, we study two information settings. In one case, the information provider 
remains anonymous, while in the other case the information provider may choose an 
identification. Most of the B2C and C2C internet pages allow for an identification of the 
provider, whereas the radio transmissions of traffic jams and radar traps are typically 
anonymous.  
The individually rational and the socially optimal solution of the game 
In a world with customers who are solely motivated by maximizing their own monetary 
payoff, no player would provide any value information, since it only bears costs but no 
monetary benefits. Hence, the inefficient outcome of zero information provision results.  
In the social optimum, however, a certain level of provision occurs. The degree of provision 
depends on the subjects’ propensity to keep items with unreported values. Individual 
rationality requires that a player keeps all drawn items with reported positive values and 
avoids any drawn items with reported negative values. The question is how a player deals 
with items with unreported values. If a player never keeps an unreported item, the information 
on a negative value is of no use for that player. In contrast, for a player who always keeps all 
items with unreported values the information on a positive value has no additional benefit. 
Suppose that a fraction q of players keeps items with unreported values and a fraction 1-q of 
players does not keep items with unreported values.10 Assume player i, who has 7-i successors 
in the chain, reports an item value. Since that item will randomly be drawn by each of her 
successors with probability 1/3 the expected benefit from reporting a positive item value vp is  
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 Note that q can also been interpreted as the probability with which individual players keep items with yet 
unreported values. Note further that we assume that q does not depend on the position of the player in the chain.  
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and the expected benefit from reporting a negative item value vn is  
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for negative value items. If, for example q=1/2, i.e. half of the successor population keeps 
items with unreported values and the other half does not, then reporting an extreme value item 
(+12 in the opportunity setting and -12 in the hazard setting) is socially optimal for all players 
up to player 6 (i ≤ 6.5) and reporting a moderate value item (-4 in the opportunity setting and 
+4 in the hazard setting) is socially optimal for all players up to player 5 (i ≤ 5.5). The overall 
benefit generated by this behavior, however, is allocated in a very asymmetric way. The 
earlier the player’s position in the chain the higher is the expected cost from reporting and the 
lower is the benefit from reporting by predecessors.  
3. The Experimental Procedure 
The experiment consists of 4 treatments (2x2-design), varying the payoff structure and the 
information structure, as described above. The four resulting treatments are OppAnon, 
OppName, HazAnon, HazName, where “Opp” denotes the opportunity setting, “Haz” denotes 
hazard setting, “Anon” denotes the anonymous setting, and “Name” denotes identification 
setting. 
The experiment was conducted as a pen and paper experiment with cubicles placed in the 
entrance to the cafeteria of the University of Erfurt. The subjects, students of all majors, were 
recruited on the spot. In the cubicle, they received a sheet with written instructions and a 
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decision sheet, on which each subject was informed about the own position in the chain and 
the number of items that had been reported by predecessors in the chain (see Appendix).  
A monitor supervised the random draw of 20 items (covered cards) out of a basket with 60 
items. Item values that were reported by predecessors were noted on the item. The subjects, 
however, could see these values only for the cards drawn. The unreported item values were 
not visible, even after the draw. The subject noted the numbers of all items drawn and the 
values that were reported. Then, the subject decided which items to keep. The values of the 
hidden items that were kept were then revealed to the subject, so that the subject could 
calculate her earnings. 
Next, the subject indicated for each of the yet unreported items that she kept whether the 
values should or should not be reported to the successors. In case the subject decided to report 
the value, the monitor noted the value of the item on the card. In the treatments, where 
identification was possible, the subjects could also write a name on each reported item. The 
monitor did not control whether this was the true name and whether it was identical for all 
reported items of a subject.  
After the subject made all necessary decisions, the monitor calculated the subject’s payoff and 
the subject was paid immediately. Subjects on average earned €4.04 (maximum €5.52 and 
minimum €2.72) including a show up fee of €4. Student IDs were used to ensure that no 
subject could play the game for a second time. Hence, we observe true one-shot decisions.  
We collected 7 independent chains (observations) in each of the four treatments. The chains 
were all run in parallel, so that the subjects lined up at the same time were never members of 
the same chain. This was clearly stated in the instructions. Due to the random sampling in the 
game, it was also impossible to identify other members of the own chain later. We had 
planned chains of seven generations, but due to time constraints most chains actually reached 
the player 6 and a few ended with the player 5. In these cases subjects did not know that they 
were actually the last player in the chain. For our evaluation we use the data for the first five 
players of all chains. In total 153 subjects participated in the experiment. 
Our statistics base on two-tailed non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney u-test and Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed ranks test) and we report comparisons as being not significant, if they 
fail to achieve a significance level of 10 percent two-tailed. For significant differences we 
report the corresponding significance level. 
 9 
4. Results 
Over all treatments 60.7% of all subjects reported at least one item value. As figure 1 shows, 
in every position – except the first – more than half of all subjects exhibit information sharing 
behavior. The number of information sharing subjects is not influenced by the position of the 
player in the chain, even though the potential benefit of information sharing for others 
decreases from round to round.   
Percentage of Players reporting
at least one item value
46.4
71.4
57.1
64.3 64.3
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5
Player in Chain
 
Figure 1 – Percentage of players reporting at least one item value  
Individual rationality requires keeping all items with reported positive values and refusing all 
items with reported negative values. Indeed only three of our subjects exhibit behavior that is 
in conflict with this rule. Hence, reporting actually creates social benefits.  
The degree to which social benefits can be created also depends on the fraction of hidden 
value items that are kept (c.f. section 2). The observed fraction q of hidden value items kept is 
on average 61.1 percent and is very similar for all positions in the chain. Inserting the 
observed value q = 0.61 in the inequalities (3) and (4), we can show that sharing information 
on extreme value items (+12 or -12) is socially beneficial in all positions up to the position 6 
in the chain of players. Reporting of a moderate value item (+4 or -4) is socially beneficial 
only for the players up to position 5. Figure 2 shows the expected net social benefit (total 
benefit of all 7 players minus reporting costs) of reporting an item’s value.  
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As displayed in figure 2, it is socially beneficial to report all unreported item values in the 
positions 1 to 5, when q = 0.61. We observe, however, that subjects on average reported item 
values only in 15.1 percent of the cases in which they could. Hence, we conclude that while 
the reporting of item values occurs more often than expected under pure payoff maximization, 
it does not occur to the extent that would be necessary to achieve the social optimum. 
Net Benefit of Reporting (at q = 0.61)
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Figure 2 – Net benefit of reporting item values when q = 0.61 
Players earlier in the chain have the potential to create greater social benefits than their 
successors. On the one hand, the earlier the information is shared, the more successors can 
benefit. On the other hand, the opportunity for reporting items is greater in earlier than in later 
rounds, because the probability of drawing unreported items decreases. Note, however, that 
with information sharing earlier positions in the chain are disadvantaged compared to later 
positions, because they have less information to avoid losses and to realize gains. Hence, 
while information sharing by subjects early on in the chain has a greater potential for 
increasing the social benefits, these subjects may be reluctant to share information, since they 
are disadvantaged with respect to their individual income. In fact, as displayed in figure 3, we 
observe that the subjects in the first position of the chain exhibit the lowest degree of 
information sharing. But, the figure also shows that the distribution of information sharing 
does not follow a clear trend across all positions in the chain. It seems that the extent to which 
subjects share information is independent of the expected social benefits and independent of 
the distribution of expected income across positions.  
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Figure 3 – Percentage of items values reported that were previously unreported 
 
Extreme versus moderate value items 
The expected net social benefit of reporting an extreme value item is higher than that of 
reporting of a moderate value item (c.f. figure 2). Indeed, in the experimental data, we find 
that extreme value items are reported much more frequently than moderate value items and 
that the ordering of the levels of reporting is the same as suggested by the net social benefit. 
In the opportunity treatments, there are no significant differences in rounds 1 to 4, but there is 
a weakly significant difference in round 5 (p=0.073, two-tailed, u-test). In the hazard 
treatments, the difference is more pronounced with no significant difference only in round 1 
and significant differences in all following rounds (p=0.001, p=0.002, p=0.003, p=0.003, for 
rounds 2 to 5, respectively, two-tailed, u-test). Figure 4 shows the percentage of the 
accumulated reported item values for the extreme and the moderate values in the opportunity 
and the hazard treatments.  
Another observation from figure 4 is that extreme hazards seem to be reported more often 
than extreme opportunities. This difference, however, is not significant in any of the rounds. 
Similarly, the difference between the frequencies with which moderate opportunities and 
hazards are reported is not significant in any of the rounds. Hence, we do not observe a 
significant difference between the frequencies of reporting extreme or moderate values across 
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treatments. But, we do observe significant differences between the frequencies of information 
sharing comparing extreme and moderate values in each treatment.   
 
Percentage of accumulated reported item values 
at the end of round ...
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Figure 4 – Development of accumulated reported item values 
The role of Identification 
Having the possibility to identify a value report with a name has no effect in the hazard 
treatment. We neither find a significant difference for the moderate value items nor for the 
extreme value items in the hazard treatment. Figure 5 visualizes this result. 
Hazard Treatment
 accumulated percentage of reported item values
0
10
20
30
40
50
1 2 3 4 5
Round
Name extreme
Anon extreme
Name moderate
Anon moderate
 
Figure 5 – Development of accumulated reported item values in the hazard treatment  
 13 
In the opportunity treatments, however, we find that identification enhances the reporting of 
extreme value items. There is no significant difference in round 1, but the difference is 
significant in rounds 2 to 5 (p=0.047, p=0.065, p=0.016, and p=0.004, respectively, two-
tailed, u-test). But notice that we do not observe any significant differences in the frequencies 
of reported moderate item values when comparing the results with and without identification. 
Figure 6 displays the development of information sharing in the opportunity treatments. 
Opportunity Treatment
 accumulated percentage of reported item values
0
10
20
30
40
50
1 2 3 4 5
Round
Name extreme
Name moderate
Anon extreme
Anon moderate
 
Figure 6 – Development of accumulated reported item values in the opportunity treatment 
The Decision to Identify by Name 
In the two Name treatments, subjects were allowed to choose an identification when reporting 
an item value. We observe that 79 percent of the reports in the opportunity treatment and 67 
percent of the reports in the hazard treatment are identified.  
Subjects choosing identification in the opportunity treatment (OppName) on average reported 
44 percent extreme and 56 percent moderate value items. Subjects not choosing an 
identification reported an average of 63 percent extreme and 37 percent moderate value items. 
The difference between the information sharing behavior of identified and not identified 
subjects is not statistically significant.  
Subjects choosing identification in the hazard treatment (HazName) on average reported 66 
percent extreme and 34 percent moderate value items, while those not choosing identification 
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only reported extreme value items. The difference between the information sharing behavior 
of identified and not identified subjects is significant (p = 0.09, two-sided, u-test).  
All in all it seems that the possibility to identify reports with names has only a single strong 
behavioral effect. The propensity of subjects to share information significantly increases for 
extreme opportunities.   
5. Evidence from amazon.de 
The experimental investigation was inspired by observations concerning information 
provision in real life situations. In order to gain a clearer picture, we deliberately excluded 
some of the features that might be of relevance in the real world and simplified the problem to 
a great extend. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the experimental data can only give us 
some clues on the mechanisms that might govern the more complex real world consumer 
evaluations. Nevertheless, to put our experimental results to rough check of external validity, 
we have collected some real world data that we analyze in this section.  
Our experimental evidence suggests that hazard warnings need no identification. What we 
actually observe is that traffic jam and radar trap warnings are often aired on radio without 
naming the information provider. The experimental data also show that the possibility of 
identification leads to more extreme than moderate value item reporting. The customer ratings 
at amazon.com can be interpreted as (a much richer) version of information provision in an 
opportunity setting with the possibility of identification by name. We conducted a (non-
representative) analysis of customer ratings of classic CDs at amazon.de. We chose classic 
CDs, because we assume that there is a broad range of quality for each composer’s 
recordings, in contrast to pop music, which is dependent on specific performers and much 
more sensitive to fads. We gathered rating data pertaining to recordings of the work of two 
composers, Chopin and Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who had a similar number of CDs listed.  
The implications from our experiment are: 1) Most reviews are for (perceived) high quality 
CDs (opportunities), i.e. observed average ratings are very high. 2) More than 2/3 of 
reviewers identify themselves. 3) There is no substantial effect of identification on the ratings. 
Table 1 shows our empirical finding that support the three claims.  
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Table 1 – Two examples of customer ratings of classical music CDs at Amazon’s online shop 
  average per CD 
 available CDs all ratings anonymous ratings identified ratings 
 total rateda count ratingb countc rating countc rating 
Chopin 1506 78  (5.2%) 1.56 4.62 0.49  (31%) 4.64 1.08  (69%) 4.59 
Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy 1391 51  (3.7%) 1.14 4.03 0.27  (24%) 4.15 0.86  (76%) 3.99 
Note: The data was collected on Dec. 19, 2002, at the online CD-shop of amazon.de. 
a
 In parentheses: percent of total number of available CDs.  
b
 Ratings can be in the range from 0 to 5. 
c
 In parentheses: percent of all ratings per CD. 
 
The ratings are very high at 4.62 and 4.03 out of 5 possible points. Interestingly, the 
percentage of identified ratings is in the same range as in the experimental data (around 70 
percent). The amazon.de data also show that identification has no influence on the rating, as 
was observed in the opportunity treatment of the experiment. Hence, in this very rudimentary 
empirical test, we find no reason to doubt the external validity of our experimental results. 
6. Conclusions 
Consumer recommendations play an important role in other consumers’ decision making 
process (Bickart and Schindler 2001; Hennig-Thurau and Walsh 2003). Considerable amounts 
of costly information sharing are also observed in other situations. These costly contributions 
to information public goods are made by individuals, who seem to have a pecuniary 
disadvantage from sharing information. Our experiment excludes all possible motives except 
the concern for others well-being. In fact, not even image-scoring or any other form of 
indirect reciprocity can explain information sharing in our setting, because in our one-shot 
experiment neither the own reputation, nor behavioral norms in the group can create positive 
future payoffs for the decision-maker (Seinen and Schram 2006). We find that even in this 
toughest test situation, subjects are willing to give up some of their own payoff in order to 
inform others. Our results clearly indicate that subjects share information, even if sharing is 
costly and does not entail any monetary benefit to the provider.   
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Furthermore, we find evidence for the correlation of information sharing behavior to the 
extent of social benefit generated. More important information (i.e. information on extreme 
values) is significantly more often revealed than less important information. This observation 
is in line with the motive of social benefit enhancement that has also been documented in 
other experimental studies (e.g. Charness and Rabin 2002). We, however, also find evidence 
that subjects are not solely motivated by social benefit enhancement. Comparing the extent of 
information sharing by players in different positions of the chain, we observe that subjects in 
the early positions do not share significantly more information than the subjects in later 
positions, even though the positive impact on the expected net social benefit is the higher the 
earlier the information is revealed.  
A possible explanation for the reluctance of subjects in early positions to share even more 
information may be that by doing so they would deteriorate their low relative income position 
even further. Note that due to the effect of information accumulation – if any information 
sharing is observed – later positions generally have a higher expected payoff than earlier 
positions. This income gap increases the more information is shared. Hence, subjects may 
limit their information sharing, if they are not only motivated by social benefit enhancement, 
but also by relative payoff considerations as suggested by a rather large body of experimental 
literature (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). We are not first to find 
evidence for a mixture of these motives. Charness and Rabin (2002) report similar evidence in 
simpler games without informational dynamics.  
Our findings have a number of implications for the design and the regulation of institutions in 
which sharing information enhances the social benefit. For one thing, it seems that any 
potential for creating social benefit should be clearly communicated to all participants, in 
order to activate the individuals’ impetus to share information. Our experimental evidence 
also indicates that the motivation to enhance the social benefit may be in conflict with fairness 
considerations, especially for the individuals receiving the information early on. Hence, as 
suggested by Avery et al. (1999), it may be advantageous to introduce an additional incentive 
for these early adopters to reveal their information. 
Finally, there are numerous open questions that can be studied using the information 
accumulation paradigm that we introduce in this paper. For one thing, it would be interesting 
to see whether the introduction of monetary incentives will enhance information sharing or 
crowd it out. Another interesting research issue concerns situations in which not only the 
 17 
intended recipient, but also a third party profits from the information sharing process. These 
situations seem common place in business interactions, where firms (e.g. amazon.com or 
YouTube.com) generate substantial profits from the voluntary information sharing process 
amongst their customers. The question is whether people are willing to share information to 
the same extent as they do in our setup, when they know that profit-seeking firms take 
advantage of that information.      
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Appendix   Instructions for the Experiment 
The Chain 
• In this experiment, chains of 7 participants make their choices one after the other. Each 
participant’s choice – except for the one who is last in the chain – may influence all following 
participants in the chain. You will be informed about your position in the chain before you make 
your choice. 
• You will not be informed about the identities of the other participants in your chain at any time. 
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that you meet any other participant of your chain at the 
experiment’s location, because we run many different chains simultaneously. Each participant of 
your chain receives the same Instructions for the Experiment as you. 
The box and the cards 
There are 60 cards in the box of your chain, out of which you will randomly draw 20. 
• Each card has a fixed value: 
• 75% of the cards have a value of   – 4 [“4” in the hazard treatments]  
• 25% of the cards have a value of    12 [“ –12” in the hazard treatments]   
• At the initiation of each chain, all cards are concealed, i.e. the values of the cards are not visible.  
• If you are not first in your chain, it is possible that some cards have already been uncovered by 
your predecessors, i.e. the values of the cards are visible.  
• Before you draw your card, you will be informed about how many of the cards have already been 
uncovered, but not about the values of the uncovered cards. 
The sequence of the actions 
1. Drawing cards: You randomly draw 20 cards out of the box of your chain. 
2. Information about the values of the uncovered cards: You will be informed about the value of 
each uncovered card that you have drawn. 
3. Keep the card? For every card you draw you decide whether or not to keep the card. (Note: At 
the time of the decision, you only know the values of the uncovered cards, but not the values of 
the cards that are still concealed).  
4. If you decide to 
• keep a card, you receive the value of this card. A positive value increases your payoff, while 
a negative value decreases your payoff. 
• not to keep a card, you receive 0. 
5. Uncover the value for your successors?  
• You may uncover any card that you have kept and that has not been uncovered yet. If you 
do, all following participants of your chain who draw one of the cards that you have 
uncovered will be informed about the value of that card before they decide whether or not to 
keep the card. You will incur a cost of one point for uncovering a card. 
[only in the names treatments: 
• As you uncover a card, provide a name that you chosen and your successors will be informed 
about the name of the person, who disclosed this card.] 
The payoff 
• Each participant receives an initial endowment of 200 points. 
• The payoffs of the drawn cards and the potentially incurred cost of uncovering cards are added 
to or subtracted from the initial endowment. 
• At the end of the experiment, you will receive 2 Cents for each point. 
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Decision Sheet of Participant _____ 
 
You are the ________ participant of your chain.   _________ 
Number of cards already uncovered _______. 
 
The grey parts of the table will be completed by the experimenter. 
Keep the card? Uncover the value for 
all successors? Your 
draw 
Number 
of the 
card 
drawn 
Value of the 
card 
if uncovered: 
value 
if concealed: “?” 
yes /no if yes: value 
if no:    0 
yes /no if yes:   −1 
if no:      0 
Payoff 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
8        
9        
10        
11        
12        
13        
14        
15        
16        
17        
18        
19        
20        
   Initial endowment +  200 
   Total payoff in points  
   Total payoff in € 
( = Total payoff in points times 0.02) 
 
 
